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ALTERNATIVE THEORIES OF WAGES IN LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES:
AN EMPIRICAL TEST

1

This paper develops a methodology of distinguishing between different
theories of industrial wage determination in less developed countries and
presents the results of applying this methodology to manufacturing industry
in Colombia.

The concentration of this paper is on "economic" theories of

wage determination, rather than social and political theories.

All of the

theories considered here attempt to explain why, in many countries, the
real wages of industrial workers have continued to rise despite the in
creasing level of urban unemployment.

At a microeconomic level, these

theories have attempted to explain why individual firuis do not reduce their
wages when there is large-scale unemployment.

The phenomenon that these

theories have been developed to explain is of central importance to large
areas of development economics, such as income distribution,
choice of technique and project evaluation.

4

2

unemployment,

3

It is, therefore, interesting

to discover which of the theories are consistent with the available data.
All of the theories have been considered to some extent by other re
searchers.

However, no satisfactory empirical tests have been devised.

1

This paper is based on my Ph.D. dissertation for Yale University. The
latter benefited from comments by Gary S. Fields, James L. McCabe, Gustav
Ranis, and Lloyd G. Reynolds.
2

A particularly good exposition of this point is provided by Kuznets, s.,
"Economic Growth and Income Inequality," American Economic Review, 45, March
1955. A review of recent literature on this point is Cline, W.R., "Distribu
tion and Development: A Survey of the Literature," Journal of Development
Economics, 1, February 1975.
3

The seminal article in this field is Harris, J. and Todaro, M., "Migration, Unemployment and Development: A Two-Sector Analysis," American Economic
Review, 60, March 1970. A survey of the literature is contained in Bairoch, P.,
Urban Unemployment in Developing Countries, International Labour Office, Geneva,
1973.
4Little, I.M.D. and Mirrlees, J. A., Project Appraisal and Planning for
Developing Countries, pp. 45-47, Heineman, London, 1974.

-2There are two reasons for this state of affairs.

First, all the theories

have been developed to explain one phenomenon--the failure of the real wage
to fall in the face of widespread unempJoyme nt--and they naturally give
similar predictions about the relationsb,i p between wages and unemploymen t.
Second, the theories have typically been 4eveloped in terms of unobservabl e
variables, such as cost of turnover, and so do not lend themselves directly
to empirical testing.
The approach taken in this study is designed to get around these
difficultie s.

Instead of testing the theories' predictions about the rela

tionship between wages and unemploymen t, it was decided to test the theories
by developing their predictions about inter-firm wage differentia ls, and, in
particular, the wage differences between firms in the same industry.

These

predictions were then used in an attempt to explain the wage differentia ls
between firms of different sizes in the same industry.

The results of this

test, which was conducted for eighteen two-digit manufacturi ng industries in
Colombia, are reported in Section 4.
As well as reformulatin g the theories to explain inter-firm wage differen
tials, it was necessary to reformulate them in terms of observable variables
such as the relative quantities of labor, intermediat e goods and capital used
in production.

Such reformulati ons required the use of assumptions as to the

way in which factor intensities affect the motives for firms tv pay high wages.
The most important assumption is that firm size, in itself, is not a reason
for paying higher wages.

Thus, a larger firm may pay higher wages if it is

more capital-inte nsive or if it is more profitable than a smaller firm, but
not if the only difference between it and the smaller firm is its size.
Therefore, this study is attempting to explain the differences in wages
between firms of different sizes in terms of variables other than size.

-3-

Without this restriction, the exercise could well become tautological in the
absence of data which directly ties the motives for paying high wages to the
size of the firm.

The possibility of obtaining such data is considered in

Section 5.
For the purposes of exposition, the various theories will be divided
into two groups:
theory.

the "cost-minimizing" theories and the "profit-sharing"

The cost-minimizing theorie·s will be considered in Section 1 and

the profit-sharing theory will be analyzed in Section 2.

Section 3 will

consider the basis for distinguishing empirically between the two groups of
theories and Section 4 will report on the application of the test to
Colombian data.
1.

The Cost-Minimizing Theories
The three theories considered in this section are grouped together

because they all explain the payment of high wages in terms of increasing
the efficiency of production by improving the skill mix of the labor force
(the skill theory), by increasing the efficiency of the existing labor force
(the efficiency wage theory), or by reducing the rate of labor tur~over (the
labor turnover theory).
The skill theory will be considered first.

The fundamental idea behind

this theory is that the employment of more highly skilled workers increases
the efficiency of a firm's production methods.

It is for this reason that

more highly skilled workers can command higher wages.

If we now concentrate

our attention on a particular profit-maximizing firm, the firm will choose
its skill mix in such a way that the efficiency gain from improving the
skill mix slightly is exactly counter-balanced by the wage cost of the
improvement.

If the production function of the firm in terms of each type

-4of labor and non-labor input were known, it would be poasible to apply
calculus to this problem and derive-the opti•l skill mix, and the opti•l
wage structure.
If this theory were the only theory that could explain wage differen
tials, one would expect to observe a correlation between the average wages
paid by firms and the skill level of their workforces.

However, the observa

tion of such a correlation in a world where there are several different pos
sible causes of wage differentia ls is not proof of the operation of the
skill theory.

It is quite possible that wages are high in a firm for some

reason unrelated to skill requirement s (perbap• a strong trade union) but
that the firm still uses its high wages to attract more highly skilled
workers.

In order to be sure that high wages are due to high skill require

ments, it is necessary to develop a theory that explains why different firms
choose different skill levels and test whether this theory is consistent with
the data.

Such a model was outlined in the previous paragraph.

However, its

requirement of a detailed production function in terms of different skills
is beyond the data availabilit y of any less developed country.
A simpler approach is required and this can be achieved by noting that
any particular firm with a given capital stock, K, given quantities of
intermediat e goods, I, a given number of workers, L, and a given averGge
wage, W, will have an optimal wage structure which will be det,:mined by
such factors as the technical importance of different skills and the state
of the labor markets for these different skills.

Furthermore , if the firm

adopts this optimal wage structure, a certain amount of output will be
produced.

We thus have a production function:
Y •

F (K, I, L, W)

(1-1)

-5where:

Y is output,

K is capital stock,
Lis the number of (heterogeneous) workers,
I is intermediate goods,
Wis the average wage.
There are two points that must be made about this production function.
First, because the average wage is used instead of the whole wage structure,
it is assumed that a considerable amount of optimization has already taken
place in order to obtain the optimal wage structure.

This is, in fact,

not particularly unusual as ordinary production functions involve some degree
of optimization by excluding technically inefficient input combinations.
The second point is that this production function, and the optimization that
has taken place behind it, is not simply a technical relationship:

it also

depends on the state of the various labor markets.
Although certain general results can be obtained from the general form
of the production function (1-1), useful empirical predictions can only be
obtained if assumptions are made about the way in which wages (and thus
skill) affect the production function.

It is assumed that the effect of an

increase in skill is similar to factor-augmenting technical change.

In

other words, an increase in wages has an effect identical to an increase in
the quantity of factors.

For example, an increase in wages might result in

the employment of more careful workers who would waste less intermediate
goods, thus having the same effect as an increase in the quantity of inter
mediate goods.

Under this assumption the production function can be written:

Y = F (AK, BL, CI)
where A, B, Care functions of W.

(1-2)

-6It is also necessary to make an assumptio n about the form of A(W),

B(W) and C(W).

W,

The assumptio n is that there is some wage,

.
5
are zero and that each is of constant elasticit y in (W - W).

dA (W-W)
dB (W-W)
dC (W-W)
• a, dW
B • b, dW
C
dW
A

•

at which all
Thus:

(1-3)

C

The developme nt of this productio n function makes it possible to formu
late a specific model of firm behavior.

Let us consider a firm which pro

duces a single output according to the productio n function (1-2).

Let us also

suppose that this firm faces a downward sloping demand curve and so has some
control over the price of its product:
p = p (Y)

where:

(1-4)

Pis the price of output.

We shall also assume that the firm can buy its intermedi ate goods at a
constant price, q, but that the cost of capital (includin g interest costs)
varies with the amount of capital employed:

(1-5)

The firm's problem of maximizin g total profits is thus to maximize:

(1-6)
The first order condition s are:
3R .. dP 3Y y + p 3Y _ W = O
3L
dY 3L
3L
3R
a1
5

= dP

ay y +Pay_ q

dY ar

ar

=O

This assumptio n is made so that the final equation for estimatio n,
equation (1-7), is linear.

-7aR - dP ay y + p ay - (PK + K ddKPK) = 0
aK
dY aK
aK
aR • dP ay y +Pay_ L • O
aw
dY aw
aw
but from (1-2):
aY
ay K dA
ay L dB
ay I dC
aw• aK A dW + a1 B dW + ar C dW
Substituting this and the first three first-order conditions into the last
condition, we obtain:
dPK K dA
L dB
I dC
(PK + K dK ) A dW + w B dW + q C dW - L
This can be rewritten with the help of (1-3) to give:
dPK
a
(PK + K dK ) K -

w-w

+ WL -

b

w-w

+ q I -

c

w-w

• L

This can be rewritten:
W•

[W

dPK

+ a (PK+ K dK) K/L + c q I/L]/(1-b)

(1-7)

Equation (1-7) constitutes a formulation of our skill theory in which
wages are a function of value of capital per man (valued at marginal cost)
and value of intermediates per man.
This result is not hard to understand intuitively.

It is simply

saying that, ceteris paribus, a firm will have an incentive to pay higher
wages and employ a more highly skilled workforce if this will increase the
efficiency of its capital (if a is positive) or its intermediate goods (if
c is positive). 6 Moreover, this incentive will be greater if the value of

6

Firms will have a greater incentive to pay high wages, ceteris paribus,
if bis larger but a positive b (connnon to all firms) cannot explain inter
firm differentials.

-8capital per man or value of intermediates per man is greater.
It should be noted that value of capital per man and value of inter
mediates per man are not exogenous.

Rather, they are determined simul

taneously with the wage rate in a system of simultaneous equations that
include equation (1-7).

Thus, Section 4 will use a simultaneous equation

estimation procedure.
This result rests heavily on the assumption that wages have a factor
augmenting effect on productivity.

Essentially, it is saying that the only

reason why firms in any one industry should pick different skill mixes is
their differences in factor intensities.

Thus, this assumption rules out

the possibility that larger firms need more highly skilled workers simply
because they are large.

As pointed out in the introduction, this assumption

is essential to the results of this study.
Having considered the skill theory in some detail, it is now possible
to consider the efficiency wage theory.

The essential idea is that the pay

ment of higher wages increases the efficiency of the workers either because
it improves their diet and thus their strength or because a well paid man
tends to be more interested in his job and is prepared to put in more effort.
This theory has recently been analyzed by Stiglitz. 7
A thorough test of whether this theory could explain wage differentials
between firms would require detailed data on the effect of wageq on workers'
effort and the relative importance of effort in each firm's production methods.
No such data are available and so we must be content with testing whether the
firms' behavior is consistent with a situation where the payment of higher

7

II:

Stiglitz, J. E., "Alternative Theories of Wage Determination in LDCs,
The Efficiency Wage Model," Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 357.

-9wages increases productivity, and thus where the wage rate is an argument
in the production function.

However, this formulation of the efficiency

wage theory is identical to the fol'lllUlation of the skill theory presented
above.

Therefore, if the same assumptions are made about the way in which

wages affect productivity, the efficiency wage theory will give the same
predictions about the relationship between wages and capital-intensity
and intermediate-intensity:

(1-7)
It can also be seen that, given the restrictions on data availability,
the labor turnover theory gives the same predictions as the skill theory.
The idea behind the labor turnover theory is that a firm will incur costs
as a result of workers leaving to take up employment elsewhere.

For

example, there are costs of search, hiring and training, and production
might well be disrupted to a certain extent.

In such a situation, a firm

might be prepared to raise its wages in order to reduce turnover.

This

behavior could lead to wage differentials between firms if some firms had
larger cost• than others.

This theory has also been analyzed by Stiglitz. 8

A test of whether this theory can explain the wage differentials between
firms would require data on the differences in turnover costs and on the
responsivenees of turnover rates to changes in wages.

No such data are

available and so we are back, once again, to a situation where all we can

8stiglitz, J.E.,
"Alternative Theories of Wage Determination and
Unemployment in LDCs: The Labor Turnover Model," Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 88, May 1974.

-10say is that the payment of higher wages increases efficiency and thus,
under the assumption that the effect of wages is factor augmenting, that
firme should set their wages according to equation (1-7).
This section has produced two conclusions .

First, that the theories

cannot be distinguishe d from each other with the available data.

Second,

that the wage setting behavior predicted by the theories can, under certain
assuaptions , be represented by equation (1-7).

It is this equation which

will fora the basis of the test between these coat-minimi zing theories and
tile profit-shar ing theory which will be discussed in the next section.
It is worth noting at this point that these theories, as formulated here,
can only explain wage differentia ls between firms in one industry and not
wage differentia ls between industries.

The reason for this is that equation

(1-7) was derived on the assumption of a fixed production function.
Finally, it might be thought that the theories could be differentia ted
by the association of skill with wages if the skill theory is true, or

the aseociation of low turnover rates with high wages if the turnover theory
is correct.

However, one example will show that this view is unfounded.

If a firm pays high wages to reduce turnover, it will have more skilled
workers applying for jobs and will end up with a workforce of a higher skill

content than other firms, even if skill is a relatively unimportant factor
in productivit y.

In order to find out which theories apply in each case, it

would be necessary to have detailed information about the technologie s of a
sort that is not available.
2.

The Profit-Shar ing Theory
The theories considered in Section 1 gave similar predictions to each

other because of their great similarity:

they all justified the payment of

-11high wages in terms of it increasing efficiency and thus reducing cost.
The theory considered in this section is quite different:

it explains the

payment of high wages in terms of the firms sharing their profits with their
workers.
There are several reasons why a firm might share its profits with the
workers.

For example, the managers might feel some moral obligation to

ensure that workers had an "adequate" standard of living.
section will consider only one possible explanation:

However, this

that firms share their

profits because they are forced to by trade unions.
The idea that a firm's profitability affects the wages it pays is very
common in the literature on the effects of unions on wage negotiations. 9
The basis for this idea is that the loss to a firm from a strike is very
largely composed of lost profits.

Thus, ceteris paribus, a more profitable

firm would be prepared to pay higher wages in order to prevent a strike.
The difficulty arises because other factors enter into the determination
of wages.

Such factors include the strength of the union, the losses to the

union members resulting from a strike and the relative skills of the negotia
tors.

Unfortunately, there are no measures of these factors• and so, in order

to carry out any empirical tests, it must be assumed that they are constant
across firms in the same industry.

This assumption is again crucial to pre

vent us from simply concluding that wages are higher in larger firms because
unions are stronger.

Without an independent measure of union strength, such

a conclusion would be equivalent to saying that large firms pay high wages
because they are large.

9one example is the recent article:
Johnston, J., "A Model of Wage
Determination Under Bilateral Monopoly," Economic Journal, 82, September 1972.

-12There are two particular aspects of this assumption that are doubtful.
First, it is often thought that larger firms are in a stronger position
because they are less likely to go bankrupt.

However, this factor also

reduces the loss to the union.because the strikers' jobs are more secure.
Second, union membership is greater in larger firms than smaller firms.
However, it is not necessarily true that greater membership implies greater
strength.

Also, the fact that workers in smaller firms are lower paid

means that the workers might 11ake up in determination what they lack in
numbers.
In order to formulate a model based on the idea of unions forcing firms
to share profits, let us start by considering what would happen if the union
always went on strike in an attempt to persuade the firm to raise its wages.
Let us also assume that the union will be able to keep its members out on
strike for a longer period if the wage offer is lower.

Thus we have the

relationship:

(2-1)

S • S(W)

where Sis the proportion of days that will be lost through strikes,
Wis the wage.
For simplicity, we will assume that (1-S(W)) is of a similar form to
A(W), B(W) and C(W):
dS W-W
- dW 1-S(W) = s

(2-2)

Before applying this idea to a monopolistically competitive firm, it is
worth emphasizing that the S(W) function is not a probability function, as
its equivalent is in Johnston's Model, but it is the maximum length of strike
that the workers will ensure for any particular wage offer.

It will be

-13pointed out below that this strike need not always take place.
It is assumed that a strike prevents any production but that capital
costs must continue despite a strike.

Thus the problem of maximizing

profits can be stated as:
maximize R • (PY - q I - WL) (1 - S(W)) - PKK
One of the first-order conditions for this maximization problem is:

:: • - L(l - S(W)) - (PY - q I - WL) :: • 0
This can be rewritten using (2-2) as:
L • (PY - q I - WL)

s

w-w

This, in turn, becomes:
W•

W+

s

(2-3)

(PY/L - q I/L - W)

This condition states that wages depend on the profit per man made by
the firm and formalizes the intuitive argument at the beginning of this
section.

Note that the fact that capital costs must continue to be borne

during strikes means that the appropriate profit concept is total profits,
without deduction of capital costs.
It is important to note that, if strictly interpreted, this model
predicts that unions will strike an amount S(W*), where W* is the optimal
wage from the point of view of the firm.

However, by definition of W*,

such a strike will not induce the firm to raise wages.

Thus, if viewed

over a period of several years, the unions will keep on striking without
ever winning--a rather peculiar situation.

It seems more reasonable to

assume that unions will learn what W* should be in any year and will only

-14use their strike power if the firm ceases to recognize the power of the
unions and pays less than W*.

This would be in keeping with the view that

strikes only arise because the firm does not recognize the power of the
unions or vice versa.

Thus the function S(W) does not represent the

actual strikes that take place; instead it represents the potential
striking ability of the unions.
Finally, to facilitate comparison with the results of the previous
section, equation (2-3) can be rewritten:
W•

3.

[W +

s (PY/L - q I/Q] /

(1 + s)

(2-4)

The Two Types of Theory
Sections 1 and 2 introduced two types of theory:

theories and the profit-sharing theory.
consider how to distinguish between them.

the cost-minimizing

The purpose of this section is to
This can be done by estimating

a combined equation:

(3-1)
If this equation were estimated and if the value of a

1

were significantly

positive, it could be concluded that the profit-sharing theory was in opera
tion.

Similarly, if either a

2

or a

3

were significantly positive, it could

be concluded that the cost-minimizing theories were in operation.

It should

be noted that it is quite possible for both sroups of theories to operate
at the same time.
There is, however, one difficulty with this method of distinguishing
between the theories.

It is that there is a very strong connection between

costs of production and value added, and thus that the difference between

-15equations (1-7) and (2-4) is not as great as might appear at first sight.
This is not hard to see intuitively:

a large part of profits is made as a

result of the "mark-up" that is the difference between marginal cost and
price.

This mark-up is usually proportioned to marginal costs and so an

increase in costs will produce an increase in profits.

Therefore, it is

hard to discover whether an increase in costs has increased wages directly,
as a result of the cost-minimizing theories, or indirectly via an increase
in profits and the operation of the profit~sharing theory.
This problem is one of identification and can only be dealt with by
considering the other equations in the system.

These equations are the

factor demand equations which determine the quantities·of factors used
and thus value added per man, value of intermediates per man and value of
capital per man.

These equations are:
dPK
EP ay - (PK +
K
dK)
aK

=

0

(3-2)

EP ay - W
aL

=

0

(3-3)

EP ay - q

=

0

(3-4)

ar

where:

E

dP Y
= l + dY
P

E represents a measure of monopoly power, with a lower value of E corres
ponding to greater monopoly power.

It is reasonable to assume that the degree

of monopoly is greater for larger firms and so dummy variables for each firm
size category will be used to represent monopoly power in the empirical work
of Section 4.

Thus, there are three exogenous variables:

price of intermediate goods and supply of capital. 10

10

monopoly power,

This equals the number

The problems associated with measuring this variable are considered in
the next section. Note that the supply of capital is not a given quantity
but is a function, PK(K), which will be shifted by such factors as the cost
of capital goods and the credit-worthiness of the firm.

-16of right-hand side variables in equation (3-1) and so this equation satisfies
the order condition for identification.
The order condition is not, of course, sufficient and it is worth
giving brief consideration to the rank condition.

If the production func

tion were homogeneous to degree r, Euler's theorem can be applied to equations (3-2) to (3-4) to give the relationship:
dPK
rEPY/L =(PK+ K dK )K/L + q I/L + W

(3-5)

If Eis neglected, equation (3-5) would be observationally equivalent
to (3-1) and so the rank condition would have been violated, because equa
tion (3-1) could be expressed as a combination of equations (3-2) to (3-4).
However, the existence of E as an observable variable prevents this observa
tional equivalence and saves the identification of equation (3-1).
This discussion of identification has shown how important monopoly
power is in distinguishing between the two groups of theories and so it is
essential to understand how the difference arises.

It is simply that if a

firm pays high wages in order to increase efficiency (to cost minimize)
this motive is entirely unaffected by the market power it can exert in the
product market, because the firm would pay no more than the market wage for
a given type of worker.
in the optimal wage.
sharing theories:

Thus changes in market power do not produce changes

The situation is quite different with th~ profit

market power is an important determinant of profits and

thus wages.
This discussion also provides the rationale for estimating equation
(3-1) across firms of different sizes, which could be expected to have
different degrees of monopoly power.
Finally, it is worth noting that if we dropped the assumption that

-17firm size, in itself, were not a reason for paying high wages, the identif i
cation of equation (3-1) would fail.
being measured by firm size.

This is because monopoly power is

Thus, the inclusio n of firm size in the wage

determi nation equation (3-1) would make the,equ ation observa tionally equiva
lent with equation (3-5).

In such a situatio n, it would be impossi ble to

tell whether the associat ion between wages and profita bility is due to profit
sharing or to the fact that firms which pay higher wages employ less labor
and thus obtain higher profita bility per man. 11
4.

The Empiric al Evidence from Colombi a
The aim of this section is to outline the results of estimati ng equa

tion (3-1), using data from Colombia n manufac turing industry .

Equation (3-1)

was estimate d for each of eighteen two-dig it manufac turing industri es using
data for four firm size categori es 12 in each of five years, 1963-196 7
(giving twenty observa tions in all).
The use of a time series of cross-se ctions can produce problems of
both serial correla tion and heteros cedastic ity. 13

However, Nerlove 's pro-

cedure revealed that in this case only heteros cedastic ity was present and
the variable s were transform ed to elimina te it.

Two-stag e least squares

was applied to these transform ed data in order to obtain consiste nt estimate s

11
However , if we are prepared to assume that the direct influenc e of
firm size per se is small, we can attribu te most of the associa tion to
profit-s haring.
12

These categor ies are: 5-24 employe es, 25-99 employe es, 100-199
employe es, 200 employe es and more.
13
This is explaine d in Nerlove , M., "Furthe r Evidence on the Estimation of Dynamic Economic Relation s from a Time Series of Cross Section s,"
Econom etrica, 39, March 1971.

-18-

Two-stage least squares requires data on the exogenous variables as
well as the variables in equation (3-1).

It has already been stated that

dummy var-iables for each size category are used to represent the degree of
monopoly, E.

Size is also an important determinant of the cost of capital

because it affects the terms on which a firm can borrow money, and thus
the position of the PK(K) function.

The other exogenous variable to repre

sent shifts in the cost of capital function, P (K), was the price index of
1
14
electrical machinery,
which was taken as the price of capital goods.
Finally, a separate index of intermediate prices for each industry, constructed with the help of an input-output table, 15 was used to indicate the
supply conditions of intermediate goods.
This means that the econometric work reported below is based on the
assumption that the endogenous variables value added per

man.

value of

intermediates per man and value of capital per man were detef1!1ined by the
following equations, which can be regarded as linearized solutions of
equations (3-2) to (3-4):
(PY/L - q I/L). • ho + blDl + b.2D2 + b3D3 + b4W + bsq + b6PE
q I/L

•co+ clDl + c2D2 + c3D3 + C4W + csq + c6PE

dPK
(PK+ K dK )K/L =do+ dlDl + d2D2 + d3D3 + d4W + d5q + d6PE
where:

n1 , o2 , n3

are dummy variables representing differenceb in E across

firm size categories.

o1 = 1
14

Thus:

for size category of 25-99 employees,

n1

= 0 otherwise.

Unless otherwise stated, all data are from Departamento Administrativo
Nacional de Estadistica, Boletin Mensual de Estadistica, March 1970.
15 ·
United Nations, Economic Commission for Latin America, Economic Development of Colombia (1956), p. 296. The raw materials prices were ob
tained from International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Economic
Growth of Colombia, p. 484.
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2

= 1 for size category of 100-199 employees, D2

~

0 otherwise.

D = 1 for size category of 200 employees and more, D • 0 otherwise.
3
3
q is the price index of intermediate goods.
PE is the price index of electrical machinery.
As far as the endogenous variables were concerned, the data on average
wages, value added per man and value of intermediates per man were easily
computed from data on total wages, total value added, total value of output
and total employment for each size category of each industry.

However, the

cost of capital per man was much more difficult to derive and it is the
problems associated with this variable that constitute the main qualifica
tion to the empirical results.

There are two problems.

First the cost of

capital includes interest costs which are unobservable and could be expected
to vary between firms, because larger firms can usually borrow money more
easily.

Second, there are no data for the value of capital, only of in

stalled electrical capacity.
The first difficulty cannot be solved and so interest costs are not
included in the cost of capital used in estimating equation (3-1).

This

exclusion of interest costs constitutes an omitted variable specification
error.

It seems reasonable to assume that a more profitable firm will,

ceteris paribus, pay lower rates of interest while a more capital-intensive
firm will, ceteris paribus, pay higher rates of interest.
specification error should bias the estimated value of a
estimated value of a

3

1

Thu,=,, this
downward and the

upward.

As far as the second difficulty is concerned, the physical measure of
capital (installed electrical capacity) was transformed into a value measure
by multiplying it by the price index for electrical machinery.

This is only

-20satisfactory for representing machinery value if one unit of electrical
capacity costs the same for all types of machines, a condition that is
made more likely by the fact that each regression involves data from only
one two-digit industry.

Unfortunately, there is no way of assessing whether

this coudition is met or of predicting the likely results of such a specif~cation error.
Finally it was necessary to deflate all the variables (apart from the
size dummies) by an index of average urban wages.

The reason for this is

that each firitl sets its wages relative to the average level of wages and
so an increase in the average level will increase the wages paid by any
particular firm.
income per head

16

This index was constructed by assuming that national
represented an index of average earnings.

Such an index

must be a weighted average of an index of agricultural earnings and an
index of urban wages (which is what we must compute), the weights being
the proportion of the workforce in each sector.

As an index of agricultural

earnings was available and the proportion of tbe workforce in agriculture
(47.2%) waa knowu, 17 it was possible to work back to an index of urban
wages.

This procedure is clearly not perfect, not least because national

income per h~ad is not a particularly good index of average earnings, but
it is the best available.
The results of estimating equation (3-1) with these data L:e given in
Table One, t-statistics are given in parentheses.

There are three tests

that must be applied to these results.

16
17

Obtained from United Nations, Statistical Yearbook.

Both are given in.International Labour Office, Yearbook of Labour
Statistics.

-21Table One
Coefficients of Equation (3-1) for Each Industry
Estimated Across Firm Size Categories Within Each Industry

Industry

Value Added
Per Man
al

Estimated Coefficients
Value of Intermediates Value of Capital
Per Man
Per Man
a3
a2

Food

0.224
(3.12)

-0.025
(-2.43)

0.101
(1.31) ·

Beverages

0.092
(2.30)

0.080
(1.01)

0.007
(0.08)

Tobacco

0.374
(1. 63)

-0.973
(-1.32)

0.338
(0.68)

Clothing

0.143
(1. 26)

-0.061
(-3.08)

0.098
(1.89)

Textiles

0.267
(2.61)

0.042
(0.21)

0.203
(0.39)

Wood

0.411
(9.08)

-0.073
(-1.02)

(2. 71)

Furniture

0.312
(6.92)

0.280
(3.62)

0.053
(0.89)

Paper

0.099
(0.92)

0.084
(1.83)

0.016
(1.60)

Printing

0.526
(3.46)

-0.165
(-1.02)

0.233
(1.51)

Leather

-0.223
(-0.57)

0.255
(1.88)

0.102
(0.84)

0.160
(2.34)

(3.03)

0.006
(2.50)

0.287
(7. 06)

-0.064
(-0.48)

0.016
(0.78)

0.219
(3.42)

-0.004
(-0.15)

(2.13)

Non-Metallic Minerals

0.380
(4.24)

-0.029
(-0.85)

0.020
(1.03)

Basic Metals

0.094
(1.25)

0.041
(1.24)

-0.024
(-0.63)

Metal Products

0.420
(3.08)

0.026
(0.22)

-0.024
(-0.50)

Non-Electrical Machinery

0.320
(0.88)

0.370
(1.03)

-0.058
(-0.72)

Transport Equipment

0.360
(0.96)

0.264
(1.62)

-0.190
(-0.65)

Rubber
Chemicals
Petroleum Products

Notes:

.

0.299

0.058

0.015

(1) Value of intercept, a 0 , is not reported as it has no economic sig
nificance; (2) R 2 is not reported as this is Two-Stage Least Squares •

.,._-.:,.: ..

-22The first test is to discover whether the profit-sharing theory is in
operation and consists of testing whether a
that the estimated value of a

1

1

is positive.

Table One shows

is positive for all but one industry and the

application of a one-tailed 5% test to the t-statistics reveals that the
estimated value of a

1

is significantly positive in eleven industries:

Food, Beverages, Textiles, Wood, Furniture, Printing, Rubber, Chemicals,
Petroleum Products, Non-Metallic Minerals and Metal Products.
combined with the fact that the estimated values of a

1

These tests,

would be expected to

be biased downward, show that the profit-sharing theories are in operation
in Colombia.

Also, the size of the coefficients (typically above 0.2) shows

that quite a high proportion (over a quarter) of profits are shared with the
workers.

Thus the profit-sharing that is observed is also economically

significant.
The second test is to discover whether the cost-minimizing theories are
in operation by seeing whether a

2

is positive.

sometimes positive but not always.

Table One shows that a

is

The application of a 5% one-tailed test

on the t-statistics reveals that the values of a
in three industries:

2

are significantly positive

2

Furniture, Paper and Rubber.

The third test is also to discover whether the cost-minimizing theories
are in operation, this time by seeing whether a
shows that the estimated values of a

3

3

is positive.

are positive in all but four industries.

The application of a one-tailed 5% test reveals that a
positive in four industries:

Table One

3

is significantly

Clothing, Wood, Rubber and Petroleum Products.

However, it should be noted that the specification error tends to bias a

3

away from zero and so the evidence is not conclusive.
The second and third tests together provide evidence of the operation
of the cost-minimizing theories in six industries:

Clothing, Wood, Furniture,
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Paper, Rubber and Petroleum Products.

It is worth noting that there was

also evidence of profit-sharing in ·all of these industries apart from
Clothing and Paper.

This underlines the fact that there is nothing to

prevent both sets of theories from operating in the same industry at the
same time.
It should also be noted that the fact that the cost-minimizing
theories have not been observed in many of the industries does not imply
that factors such as skill are unimportant in explaining wage differentials.
We have only been testing their explanatory power over intra-industry wage
differentials and so they will not show up in industries in which there are
only small differences between firms in capital-intensity and intermediate
intensity, or in which the capital-augmenting and intermediate-augmenting
effects of wages are small.

Skill, at least, might well be a more powerful

explanation of inter-industry wage differentials.
5.

Conclusions
This study can be divided into two parts, theoretical and empirical.

The theoretical part argued that there was a group of theories, the cost
minimizing theories, that could not be distinguished from each other with
the available data.

However, a test was developed which could distinguish

between the cost-minimizing theories as a group and the profit-sharing
theory.

The empirical part of the study then applied this test to data

from Colombian manufacturing industry, in an attempt to explain why larger
firms within each industry tend to pay considerably higher wages than small
firms.

The main result was that both the profit-sharing theories and the

cost-minimizing theories had a role to play in explaining this phenomenon.
However, profit-sharing on an appreciable scale appeared to be involved in
more industries than was the operation of the cost-minimizing theories.

-24These results are subject to several qualificatio ns.

Most of these

qualificatio ns apply only to this particular example of empirical work18
and do not constitute criticisms of the basic methodology .
is one qualificatio n that applies to the whole methodology .

However, there
It is the need

to assume that firm size, in itself, is not a reason for paying higher
wages.

In the context of the cost-minimi zing theory, this was an assumption

that firm size does affect the relationshi p between wages and productivit y.
In the context of the profit-shar ing theory, this was an assumption that
firm size does not affect the balance of bargaining power.

The essential

nature of this assumption is demonstrate d by the fact that it is essential
to achieve the identificat ion of the wage equation (3-1).

Thus, without

definite confirmatio n of this assumption, our empirical conclusion is simply
that the wage differentia ls between firms of different size is consistent
with the simultaneou s operation of both the cost-minimi zing theories and
the profit-shar ing theory but that it is also consistent with the hypothesis
that large firms pay more because of some feature (such as higher unioniza
tion) which is not captured by differences in value added per man, value of
intermediat es per man or cost of capital per man.
One way of testing the validity of the assumption that firm size does
not affect the relationshi p between wages and productivit y would be to
directly estimate the effects of wages on productivit y by estirr,ting the
production function (1-1):

Y

=

F(K,L,I,W)

(1-1)

18The main
qualificatio ns in this category are the small-sampl e bias
of two-stage least squares and the specificatio n errors that result from an
inability to observe the cost of capital.

-25Such an estimation would also be of great value because it would give
direct estimates of the elasticitie s of factor productivit ies.

These values

could then be compared with the values obtained from estimating equation
(3-1).

However, this type of estimation was impossible in this study because

it would require a considerabl e amount of data on individual firms and this
is not available.
Data of similar detail would also be nece$sary to test whether firm
size affects the balance of bargaining power in wage negotiation s.

However,

it would be very interesting to test this asswaption as soon as data does
I

become available.

In this connection it is worth pointing out that even if

firm size does bave some direct effect on wages, 'it would not necessarily
destroy the results of this study.

The question would then become one of how

much of the wage differentia ls can be explained by firm size alone and how
much by the theories considered here.

The advent of such data would not

destroy the methodology here; it would simply remove the necessity of
assuming that firm size does not directly affect wages.

__
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